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The Case of Subpoenas
In Federal Trade Commission v. Texaco, Inc.,' the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) sought to enforce subpoenas requiring from natural
gas producers internal documents relating to gas reserve estimates. The
producers resisted these subpoenas on grounds, inter alia, of collateral
estoppel. 2 Because the accuracy of certain of the estimates had already
been the subject of an administrative proceeding before another
agency,3 the Commission's subpoenas arguably sought to reopen issues
already determined in a competent forum. Although the defendants'
collateral estoppel defense eventually proved unsuccessful, Federal
Trade Commission v. Texaco, Inc. raises important questions regard-
ing the application of collateral estoppel to the subpoena stage of an
administrative proceeding.4
The diversity of views expressed by the judges in the Texaco litiga-
tion illustrates the difficulties that courts have faced in analyzing the
collateral estoppel defense to administrative subpoenas. The district
court refused to enforce the FTC subpoenas; without relying squarely
1. 555 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977).
2. A subpoena duces tecum specifying bid files and other geophysical models and
projections of natural gas reserves was issued by the FTC in November 1971. The FTC
investigation focused on the anticompetitive impact of the gas producers' reporting
techniques. The gas producers filed motions to quash the subpoenas with the FTC. In
June 1972, the Commission denied the motions. Some of the defendants agreed to comply
with the subpoenas, but several gas producers negotiated with the Commission for a
year over the subpoenaed material. The FTC filed a petition for enforcement of the
subpoenas in United States District Court on June 4, 1973. FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d
862, 866-70 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977).
3. The defendants argued that collateral estoppel should limit the scope of the FTC's
inquiry because the Federal Power Commission (FPC) had found that the gas reserve
estimates were accurate for the purposes of ratemaking in the FPC investigation of re-
serves and rates for the Southern Louisiana Area (So. La. I). See Area Rate Proceeding,
et al. (Southern Louisiana Area), 46 F.P.C. 86, 110-16 (1971), af'd sub. nom. Placid Oil
Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S.
283 (1974). The defendants' argument in FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977), assumes that if the estimates were accurate, the
FTC's theory of anticompetitive reporting techniques must fail because any such illegal
activity would involve attempts to manipulate gas rates through inaccurate reserve es-
timates. The defendants alleged that the FTC was trying to review the FPC's finding that
the reserves estimates were accurate, and collateral estoppel must deny the FTC access
to the materials subpoenaed for this purpose. Joint Memorandum of Respondents in
Opposition to FTC Petitions for Enforcement at 41-51, FTC v. Texaco, Inc., No. 1089-73
(D.D.C., March 22, 1974).
4. The collateral estoppel defense was also raised unsuccessfully in subpoena enforce-
ment proceedings in FTC v. Feldman, 532 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1976), and FTC v. Markin,
532 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1976). See note 14. infra.
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on any of the defenses raised, the court ruled that it would be "im-
proper" to allow the Commission to reinvestigate the gas reserve esti-
mates. 5 The court of appeals panel affirmed the district court's order
unanimously by holding that collateral estoppel supported modifica-
tion of the subpoenas.0 But the court of appeals vacated the panel de-
cision, reheard the case en banc, and voted four to two to reverse the
district court's judgment.7
Writing for the majority, Judge Bazelon held that collateral estoppel
was a substantive defense, inappropriate at the subpoena stage of an
administrative proceeding "when the agency lacks the information to
establish its case." s Judge Leventhal's concurring opinion reached the
merits of the collateral estoppel defense and concluded that estoppel
should not be enforced in the instant case. Because quasi-legislative
agency activities such as ratemaking are generally considered to be
immune from collateral estoppel, Judge Leventhal decided that the
FTC could not properly be bound by a judgment in a ratemaking
proceedingY Judge Wilkey's dissent responded that collateral estoppel
was an appropriate defense to an administrative subpoena and that de-
ferring consideration of collateral estoppel until the complaint stage
"[did] violence to the sound policy justifications underlying the
doctrine."'1 Further, Judge Wilkey argued that estoppel should be en-
forced notwithstanding that the original decision on the reserve
estimates issue took place in the context of a ratemaking proceeding.11
The split in the Texaco court reflects the divisions that exist among
5. See FTC v. Texaco, Inc., No. 1089-73 (D.D.C., March 22, 1974), reprinted in FTC
v. Texaco, Inc., 517 F.2d 137, 159-62 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd en banc, FTC v. Texaco,
Inc., 555 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977).
6. FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 517 F.2d 137, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd en banc, FTC v.
Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977).
7. 555 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977).
8. Id. at 879; see id. at 877-81 (discussion by Judge Bazelon).
9. Id. at 893 (concurring opinion). See Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,
284 U.S. 370, 389 (1932) (collateral estoppel is inapplicable to agency fulfilling legis-
lative function like ratemaking). Judge Leventhal's argument assumes that because an
agency engaged in a ratemaking proceeding could not be bound by previous findings,
or rates, no agency could be bound by a finding of another agency that had been en-
gaged in ratemaking. But see note 56 infra.
10. 555 F.2d at 926 (dissenting opinion).
11. In his opinion for the unanimous circuit court panel, Judge Wilkey emphasized
that the FTC knew of the FPC's adjudicative proceedings in So. La. II when it initiated
its investigation and could have intervened in the proceeding. When he turned to the
FPC proceedings, he found that "an area rate proceeding, bringing together as it does
sharply divergent economic interests in the same arena to do battle, provided an ex-
cellent context in which to resolve such an issue. The record clearly indicates . . . an
adversarial environment .... " FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 517 F.2d 137, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
rev'd en banc, FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974
(1977).
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the circuits in their treatment of collateral estoppel in the discovery
stage of administrative proceedings. The Texaco majority opinion cites
two recent cases that reject per se the collateral estoppel defense to
administrative subpoenas. 12 The courts of appeals in those cases relied
on a series of precedents in which the Supreme Court' 3 was extremely
protective of agency subpoenas.14
The Texaco dissenters argued that the Supreme Court has never
addressed the question of the collateral estoppel defense to adminis-
trative subpoenas.'5 Moreover, the dissent relied on a Second Circuit
case, Safir v. Gibson,"O in which Judge Friendly enforced estoppel
12. FTC v. Markin, 532 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1976); FTC v. Feldman, 532 F.2d 1092
(7th Cir. 1976). See note 14 infra.
13. In response to private party challenges to administrative subpoenas, the Supreme
Court has severely limited the defenses available to the challenging party. E.g., United
States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (denying due process challenge to
FTC document request: "it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the
agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably
relevant"); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946) (re-
sponding to Fourth Amendment challenge to administrative subpoena: "It is enough
that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose .... "); Endicott Johnson
Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943) (courts should deny jurisdictional challenge if
subpoena is reasonably relevant to matter within agency's authority). The lower courts
have followed the Endicott Johnson rule when evaluating jurisdictional challenges to
administrative subpoenas. See, e.g., Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Port of Seattle, 521
F.2d 431, 434 (9th Cir. 1975); note 45 infra. Further, the circuits have applied to col-
lateral estoppel defenses the standards for subpoena review outlined by the Court in
these cases. See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 879 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977) (citing Endicott Johnson as controlling Texaco's collateral
estoppel defense); FTC v. Feldman, 532 F.2d 1092, 1095-96 (7th Cir. 1976) (beginning
analysis of collateral estoppel defense to subpoena with statement of Oklahoma Press
rule).
14. But the courts in FTC v. Feldman, 532 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1976), and FTC v.
Markin, 532 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1976), did not rest on the Supreme Court cases alone.
In both cases the defendants argued that judgments in their favor in an earlier case
brought pursuant to the Sherman Act prevented the FTC from relitigating the same
issues. The court in each case ruled that the former judgments, in United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338 (1949), did not bar the FTC subpoenas. Like Judge
Leventhal in his concurring opinion in FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 893 (D.C.
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977) (concurring opinion), the courts in
both of these cases proceeded to the merits of the collateral estoppel defense. In Feldman
the court emphasized that the original Sherman Act prosecution and judgment was
more than 25 years old and that the facts and circumstances had probably changed.
The court distinguished the panel decision in Texaco because in that case the FPC and
FTC investigations took place concurrently, and thus coordination of agency action was
possible. Moreover, the Feldman court stressed that the two agencies in Texaco examined
estimates for the same years. 532 F.2d at 1097. In Markin the court also questioned
whether the previous judgment addressed the same issues as the instant investigation.
The court argued that since the Federal Trade Commission Act's scope exceeded that
of the Sherman Act, the earlier judgment of the defendant's conduct could not foreclose
suit under a different standard. 532 F.2d at 544.
15. 555 F.2d at 927-29 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
16. 432 F.2d 137 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970). See notes 30, 95 infra.
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before discovery was completed in an administrative proceeding.' 7
Judge Friendly's language is broad enough to endorse estoppel at the
subpoena stage of an administrative proceeding:
We recognize there is a general rule against judicial interference
with administrative proceedings prior to the issuance of a final
order . . . . [Nevertheless] the reason for applying res judicata
to administrative agencies is not only to "enforce repose" but also
to protect a successful party from being vexed with needlessly
duplicitous [sic] proceedings .... If the latter interest is not pro-
tected at the outset of the second proceeding, it will be lost ir-
reparably.18
This Note analyzes the collateral estoppel defense to administrative
subpoenas. Part I traces the evolution of collateral estoppel in the
courts and the application of collateral estoppel to administrative
agencies. It then focuses on the specific problem of the Texaco liti-
gation-the application of estoppel to an administrative subpoena-
and describes the goals that an effective subpoena estoppel policy
should achieve. Part II addresses two obstacles to an effective sub-
poena estoppel policy: (i) limits placed on other subpoena defenses,
and (ii) limits placed on collateral estoppel outside the administra-
tive subpoena context. Part III suggests an alternative set of considera-
tions for analyzing an estoppel defense to a subpoena. These con-
siderations are employed in Part IV to construct a proposed rule for
applying collateral estoppel to an administrative subpoena. The rule
is then applied in Part V to two hypothetical subpoena estoppel cases.
1. Collateral Estoppel and Administrative Subpoenas
Developed by the courts in the interests of equity, collateral es-
toppel can be invoked by a party to a new proceeding to give binding
17. In Safir v. Gibson, 432 F.2d 137 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970), a
claimant brought an action before the Federal Maritime Administration (FMA) to re-
cover damages for discriminatory pricing. The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) had
previously found that the same defendants, members of a steamship conference, set un-
reasonably low rates in an effort to drive out competitors in violation of the Shipping Act
of 1916, § 15, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (Supp. V 1975). The second proceeding, before the FMA,
was to determine whether the plaintiff could recover subsidies pursuant to the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936, § 810, 46 U.S.C. § 1227 (1970). Judge Friendly ordered that the
FMA not relitigate the unjust discrimination issue, the key element of a § 810 violation,
as the FMC adjudication based on the Shipping Act collaterally estopped the agency.
See p. 1267 & note 95 infra.
18. 432 F.2d at 143 (emphasis added).
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effect to determinations of issues resolved in a former judgment.19
Although traditional collateral estoppel doctrine required an identity
of parties in the two actions,2 0 this formal requirement has been re-
laxed. 21 Collateral estoppel now may be invoked by a nonparty to
the original action against both original parties and litigants deemed
to be in privity with original parties.2 2 Collateral estoppel, then, does
not merely freeze a relationship between two parties to a judgment,
but instead limits each individual to one opportunity to litigate a
given issue.2 3
The application of collateral estoppel to administrative proceed-
ings was a natural extension. Not only did it coincide with the ex-
pansion of collateral estoppel generally, but it also reflects the fact
that the number of cases formally adjudicated in federal agencies
now easily exceeds the number of cases filed in the federal courts.24
Supreme Court decisions now establish that the collateral estoppel
principle is available to litigants in the burgeoning field of adminis-
trative adjudication. In Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,25
the Supreme Court found privity between officers of the same
government. 26 In United States v. Utah Construction & Mining
19. See F. JAMES 9- G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.16, at 563-64 (2d ed. 1977)
(collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is available "even though the second action
involves a different claim or cause of action") (citing Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94
U.S. 351, 353 (1877)).
20. See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912);
RESrATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93(b) (1942).
21. The identity of parties requirement was also expressed in terms of a mutuality
of estoppel rule. Under the rule, any individual wishing to invoke estoppel against
another party would have to be subject to a reciprocal claim if the original judgment
were to be reversed or had it been favorable instead to the second party originally. The
mutuality rule effectively would prevent any expansion of estoppel doctrine in favor
of individuals not parties to the first action.
This rigid rule was attacked in Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n,
19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), which rejected the requirement that a party claiming
estoppel must have been a party (and so be "bound") to the first action. Id. at 812, 122
P.2d at 895. See Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 IowA L. REV. 27,
43-76 (1964). The Supreme Court expressly approved of Bernhard in Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 324-25 (1971).
22. Privity can exist because one party is vested with authority to represent another
party in litigation (as in a class action or through assignment of a claim), or because of
the parties' substantive relationship (family, organizational affiliation). See F. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, supra note 19, at §§ 11.26-11.29.
23. Accordingly, courts have rejected the mutuality rule in a wide range of litigation
and have focused on the estopped party's opportunity to litigate the issue in question.
See Note, Collateral Estoppel Effect of Agency Actions in Civil Litigation, 46 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 65, 78 n.99 (1977).
24. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.02, at 4 (Supp. 1970).
25. 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
26. Id. at 402-03. The Court did not permit the private party defendant to relitigate
the validity of an exemption in a suit brought by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
after the defendant had lost that issue in litigation before the National Bituminous
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Co. 2  the Court cited with approval lower court cases that enforced
estoppel on the basis of a prior agency adjudication.28 Taken together
with the Court's decision in Sunshine, Utah Construction binds one
agency to the administrative adjudications of another.29
Judge Friendly argued in Safir v. Gibson that if the interest of pri-
vate parties in protection from "needlessly [duplicative] proceedings"
"is not protected at the outset of the second proceeding, it will be
lost irreparably." 30 The rationale of collateral estoppel is to bring
Coal Commission. Estoppel thus worked offensively to help the government prove its
case. The Court held: "There is privity between officers of the same government so
that a judgment in a suit between a party and a representative of the United States
is res judicata in relitigation of the same issue between that party and another officer
of the government." Id. The Sunshine principle has been adopted by state courts as
well. See generally Rynsburger v. Dairymen's Fertilizer Coop., 266 Cal. App. 2d 269, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 102 (1968); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENT'S § 85(I)(d) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975).
Sunshine accomplished through the privity concept what Bernhard v. Bank of America,
Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), had achieved through a
direct attack on traditional collateral estoppel rules: extension of the binding effect of
a judgment beyond the original parties. But the privity concept binds the government
only to the specific issues adjudicated in a given case; privity does not commit any govern-
mental department or agency to abandonment of the general policy or position that
underlay the original investigation and adjudication. See generally Vestal, Relitigation
by Federal Agencies: Conflict, Concurrence, and Synthesis of Judicial Policies, 55 N.C.L.
Rav. 123 (1977).
27. 384 U.S. 394 (1966). In Utah Construction estoppel was claimed by the government
defensively to shield against a contract claim previously decided in the government's
favor by an administrative agency. The Court stated: "When an administrative agency
is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which
the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated
to apply res judicata to enforce repose." Id. at 422.
28. The Court cited Fairmont Aluminum Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 622 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 838 (1955) (collateral estoppel applied to findings of ad-
ministrative agency). The Court also suggested that Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.
591 (1948), contemplated the application of res judicata to administrative findings. 384
U.S. at 422.
29. If one federal agency were to lose a claim in an administrative proceeding, a
second federal agency could be estopped from asserting that claim, or the same issues,
against the same defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Willard Tablet Co., 141 F.2d 141
(7th Cir. 1944), discussed at note 91 infra. The defendant's argument would rest on the
Supreme Court's holding in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940),
discussed at notes 25-26 supra, that privity existed between federal officers.
If the first federal agency won the original claim against the defendant, a second
federal agency could use estoppel offensively to deny the defendant the opportunity to
contest issues previously decided. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S.
381 (1940), discussed at notes 25-26 supra (res judicata was used offensively by govern-
ment to prove its tax case); Safir v. Gibson, 432 F.2d 137 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
850 (1970) (estoppel used offensively, though for benefit of private party plaintiff); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88, Reporter's Note at 99 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1975) (distinctions between offensive and defensive use of estoppel have not been widely
accepted). But see McCook v. Standard Oil Co., 393 F. Supp. 256, 258 (C.D. Cal. 1975)
(mutuality rule retained to limit offensive use of estoppel, although its abandonment is
justified when estoppel is used defensively).
30. Safir v. Gibson, 432 F.2d 137, 143 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
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about finality and prevent duplicative litigation.3' But given the vexa-
tiousness of administrative discovery, 32 the parties' interest in finality
should be recognized before the value of finality has been lost. Es-
toppel at the subpoena stage would serve the goal of finality by for-
bidding not only relitigation but also rediscovery of issues previously
decided in a competent forum.
The application of collateral estoppel to administrative subpoenas
nevertheless creates special problems. Collateral estoppel at the sub-
poena stage could seriously impede agency enforcement efforts if the
estoppel were to exceed the scope of issues previously decided. The
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 33 requires an investigating agen-
cy to state the purpose of its inquiry at the outset.34 So long as the
purpose of the inquiry is lawful,35 a party can be required to pro-
duce specific documents if those documents are reasonably relevant30
to the agency's investigative purpose. A successful collateral estoppel
defense to an administrative subpoena would deny the agency access
to documents or other materials that are relevant only to an issue
already decided by another agency. Yet the documents in question
might be relevant to another subject that is outside the stated purpose
of the inquiry but within the agency's jurisdiction. To deny enforce-
ment of a subpoena on the basis of a prior administrative adjudica-
tion of a given issue prevents the agency not only from retrying that
31. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599-602 (1948); F. JAMFS & G. HAZARD,
supra note 19, § 11.2, at 532 ("[The res judicata rules give] recognition to the fact that
the purpose of a lawsuit is not only to do substantial justice but to bring an end to
controversy."); Note, supra note 23, at 69.
32. See Wall St. J., Nov. 2, 1977, at 15, col. I (FTC attorney suggests that discovery in
current FTC suit against major oil companies will amount to 40 million pages); Affidavit
Submitted on Behalf of Texaco, Inc., in Support of Respondents' Joint Response to Com-
plaint Counsel's Motion for Issuance of Subpoenas Duces Tecumn at 4, In re Exxon Corp.,
No. 8934 (FTC July 17, 1973) (Texaco's actual cost to evaluate 1800-page FTC subpoena in
excess of $200,000); Letter from Sharon Jacobs, Legal Dep't, Texaco, Inc. (Jan. 6, 1978)
(estimates of compliance costs in Exxon case range from $20 million to $150 million, or
from 750 to 6,700 man-years) [on file with Yale Law Journal]; Brief for Appellee at 7,
FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 517 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd en banc, 555 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977) (compliance with FTC subpoenas would cost several
million dollars and thousands of man-hours of effort).
33. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1970).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1970) (party entitled to showing of general relevance and to
reasonableness of scope of evidence "when required by rules of procedure"). See FTC
v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 905 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977)
(Wilkey, J., dissenting).
35. The "lawful purpose" requirement is satisfied if the inquiry focused on a subject
within the agency's jurisdiction. The origin and development of the "lawful purpose"
standard is discussed at pp. 1256-57 & notes 45-48 infra.
36. The "reasonable relevance" requirement is satisfied if the requested documents
were remotely material to the agency's purpose. The development of the "reasonable
relevance" standard is discussed in notes 44-45 infra.
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issue but also from framing new issues for inquiry based on materials
the agency would otherwise receive.37 If the agency has no other basis
for formulating issues for inquiry, estoppel of a subpoena could pre-
vent the agency from reaching issues that have not been decided.
Subpoena estoppel policy, therefore, should reconcile the competing
interests of finality and thorough agency law enforcement. Indeed,
an effective subpoena estoppel policy should go beyond accommodat-
ing these interests and should further more efficient law enforcement
by encouraging agency cooperation in areas of overlapping jurisdic-
tion.38 By forbidding an agency from rediscovering and relitigating
an issue decided in an earlier administrative adjudication, subpoena
estoppel policy could encourage the FTC and other agencies to de-
velop rules that permit coordinate agency intervention.3 9 Because sub-
37. Judge Wilkey's dissent in FTC v. Texaco, 555 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977) (dissenting opinion), ignores this problem. "[Unlike applying
res judicata], to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel . . . we need not attempt to
forecast the ultimate conclusion . . . of the FTC's proposed investigation; we need only
define ONE FACTUAL ISSUE ... which has already been determined. ... 555 F.2d
at 929 (emphasis in original).
As noted in text, the gulf between res judicata and collateral estoppel narrows in the
subpoena context, because collateral estoppel of a subpoena could effectively deny an
agency access to issues in addition to those previously decided. Although documents can
be obtained by subsequent subpoenas requesting documents responsive to the "second
issue," the agency might never obtain access to material giving rise to the second line
of inquiry. This "secondary estoppel" problem is most significant when an agency is
first beginning an investigation, is less likely to have focused the theory underlying the
inquiry, and has no means of comparing the relative merits of alternative avenues of
investigation. See p. 1268 infra.
38. Agency overlap can be traced to the manner in which agency jurisdiction is de-
fined. The FTC has broad jurisdiction over trade practices. Other agencies have primary
responsibility for particular activities, e.g., investment markets (Securities and Exchange
Commission), entry into certain industries (Interstate Commerce Commission, Civil Aero-
nautics Board), rates charged by certain enterprises (Federal Communications Commission),
but none of these activities excludes the other. In the Texaco case, both the FTC and
the FPC were interested in the reporting of gas reserves, which is significant both for
rates and for competition within the industry. Because a given transaction can have sig-
nificance for investors, consumers, and competitors simultaneously, the agencies' interests
frequently overlap. See generally B. SCHWARTZ & H. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF GOVERN-
MENT: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 27-30 (1972), excerpted in
W. GELLHORN 9- C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 8-11 (1974).
39. The FPC specifically allows state agency intervention under 16 U.S.C. § 825(g)
(1970); a more general FPC intervention rule is listed at 18 C.F.R. § 1.8 (1977). The
SEC's general intervention rule can be found at 17 C.F.R. § 201.9(a) (1977). See also
16 C.F.R. § 4.6 (1977) ("[I]t is the policy of the [Federal Trade] Commission to cooperate
with other governmental agencies to avoid unnecessary overlapping or duplication of
regulatory functions.")
The FPC proceeding in the Texaco case employed the intervenor rules. Judge Wilkey,
in his dissent, noted that a variety of public and private interests was represented at
the Power Commission hearings. 555 F.2d at 931. Although the intervenor rules are
generally used for representation of other private parties. no construction of the standards
for intervention-the rules defining standing to intervene-should deny such a right to
an agency seeking to avoid later estoppel on the matters being investigated.
Avoidance of prejudice to a subsequent proceeding might well qualify even under
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poena estoppel would increase the availability of collateral estoppel
in administrative proceedings generally, it would serve administrative
efficiency by making rediscovery and relitigation of some matters un-
necessary. 40
To further these goals of finality, thorough agency law enforcement,
and administrative efficiency, a subpoena estoppel defense must not
generate more litigation costs than it avoids. A private party would
be unlikely to resort to the estoppel defense if compliance with the
subpoena cost less than litigating the estoppel question. Thus the
framework for analyzing a collateral estoppel defense must itself re-
flect the underlying purpose of estoppel-the avoidance of unnecessary
litigation.
II. Barriers to an Effective Subpoena Estoppel Policy
A. Limits Placed on Other Subpoena Defenses
United States v. Morton Salt Co.41 exemplifies the deference paid
by the Supreme Court to administrative subpoenas. In that case the
Court allowed an agency "fishing expedition" based on no more than
"official curiosity. ' 42 The Court said the subpoenas should be en-
forced if the demand was not too indefinite and if the material sought
was reasonably relevant to a lawful administrative purpose.43 Rigidly
the "intervention by right" standard of FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). See generally Shapiro, Some
Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REv.
721, 731-35 (1968) (discussing intervention rules and suggesting that expansion of gov-
ernmental intervention is "plainly desirable"). Cf. Maclntyre & Volhard, Intervention
in Agency Adjudications, 58 VA. L. REv. 230, 232 (1972) (addressing FTC rules for in-
tervention by private parties representing public interest).
40. Although mutuality of estoppel is somewhat discredited, see note 21 supra, broader
application of collateral estoppel as a shield in administrative law will make estoppel
more available to the agencies as a sword. Cf. North Carolina v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.,
537 F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1977) (because defendants could
not use favorable FTC judgment as bar to Sherman Act suit, court refused to allow
government prosecutors to use FTC findings to prove essential elements of Sherman Act
prosecution); RESTATENENT (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88, Reporter's Note at 99 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1975) (criticizing distinctions in availability of estoppel based on offensive
or defensive application). The overlap-of-issues standard recommended by this Note, see
pp. 1266-67 infra, would of course be available to the agencies to facilitate proof of
claims against defendants. If the second agency could take advantage of the previous
adjudication, relitigation and rediscovery would be unnecessary.
41. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
42. Id. at 641, 652. In Morton Salt a private corporation objected to an FTC re-
quirement that it file periodic reports to prove compliance with a court-approved cease-
and-desist order. The Court rejected the defendant's contention that the FTC subpoenas
violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court held that the agency's
subpoena power extended beyond cases and controversies and supported the subpoena.
338 U.S. at 641-43.
43. Id. at 652.
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applied, this rule would effectively foreclose the collateral estoppel
defense to administrative subpoenas. None of the elements of the
Court's enforcement standard-definiteness, relevance, and lawful pur-
pose-has provided for significant judicial supervision of administra-
tive subpoenas. 44
Yet the Court adopted this standard in contexts presenting far
different considerations from those involved in a collateral estoppel
defense. Morton Salt's "lawful purpose" standard represents the Court's
response to jurisdictional defenses to subpoenas. 45 The Supreme Court
44. Although the Court listed "definiteness" as an independent requirement for en-
forcement of a subpoena in Morton Salt, id., the Court neglected that element in Okla-
homa Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946), discussed at note 13
supra. Although lower courts continue to list "definiteness" as an independent element
of the Morton Salt standard, no court has denied enforcement of a subpoena on this
ground alone. In practice, definiteness is merged with relevance. Compare Adams v. FTC,
296 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 864 (1962) (court listed definiteness
as independent part of Morton Salt standard) with Schultz v. Yeager, 293 F. Supp. 794
(D.N.J. 1967), aff'd, 403 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 961 (1969) (sub-
poena unlimited as to relevance or specificity violated Fourth Amendment). See note 45
infra. See generally I K. DAvIs, A MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.06, at 188-89 (1958).
The relevance requirement is no longer an important vehicle for judicial control of
administrative subpoenas. Compare FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306
(1924) (agency must provide court with evidence of a given document's materiality before
court will order production) with United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652
(1950) (sufficient to show that inquiry is within agency's authority, demand is not too
indefinite, and information sought is reasonably relevant). See generally I K. Dwis, supra
§ 3.06, at 183-88.
The "lawful purpose" of the investigating agency extends at least as far as its sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction, because the Court has made clear that the agencies, and not
the courts, should first evaluate those facts that support the agencies' jurisdiction. See
Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943). Although the lawful pur-
pose standard cannot serve as a real basis for challenging an agency's jurisdiction at
the subpoena stage, lawful purpose cannot be strictly equated with subject-matter juris-
diction, because to do so ignores accepted substantive subpoena defenses. E.g., Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 263 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (attorney-client privilege
would protect some corporate documents from discovery even if those documents were
relevant to inquiry within agency's subject-matter jurisdiction); Gibson v. Florida Legis-
lative Investigation Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (request for membership list of NAACP
infringes rights of free and private association). Morton Salt's "lawful purpose" require-
ment could be the vehicle for a nonjurisdictional subpoena defense such as collateral
estoppel.
45. The Supreme Court held in Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509
(1943), that the private party's challenge to the Department of Labor's jurisdiction was
premature as a defense in a subpoena enforcement proceeding, unless the material re-
quested was plainly irrelevant to any lawful purpose of the Secretary of Labor. The
circuits have generally followed this limited rule. See Blue Ribbon Quality Meats v. FTC,
560 F.2d 874 (8th Cir. 1977); FTC v. Swanson, 560 F.2d I (lst Cir. 1977); FTC v. Gibson,
460 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1972). But see FTC v. Miller, 549 F.2d 452, 456 (7th Cir. 1977)
(court denied enforcement of FTC subpoena because common carrier defendant was
"plainly exempt" from agency's jurisdiction). In later cases, the limitation placed on
jurisdictional challenges to subpoenas-the Endicott Johnson rule-became the standard
for court enforcement of a subpoena. The Court relied on Endicott Johnson to refute
nonjurisdictional subpoena defenses. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
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has consistently protected administrative subpoenas from objections
to jurisdiction and has warned against denying agencies access to "juris-
dictional facts." 46 Lower courts have responded by protecting agency
subpoenas seeking arguably jurisdictional facts, 47 even when the party
objecting to the subpoena presented a collateral estoppel (as opposed
to a jurisdictional) defense. 48
When a case involves either exhaustion of remedies49 or primary
jurisdiction,"o jurisdictional facts should be determined by an agency
at the outset of an investigation. Both doctrines involve choosing be-
U.S. 186, 209-11 (1946); note 13 supra. The "definiteness" requirement deflected a Fourth
Amendment challenge to a subpoena in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 209 (1946).
46. Jurisdictional facts are those facts on which a forum's jurisdiction depends. See
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54-57 (1932) (jurisdiction of United States Employees'
Compensation Commission depended on whether or not injury occurred on navigable
waters of U.S. and whether or not claimant was employed by interstate shipper).
47. See notes 13 & 45 supra. The jurisdictional facts concept protected an adminis-
trative subpoena in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 201, 213-14
(1946). Before complying with a subpoena, a publishing company sought to require that
the FTC establish statutory authority over it. The Court rejected this defense and held
that the agency could not be denied access to the very information that would support
its inquiry.
Ohlahoma Press can be read narrowly as holding that jurisdictional objections are
premature at the subpoena stage. A more expansive reading concludes that the jurisdic-
tional facts must be delivered to the administrative agency, regardless of the defense
to the subpoena in question. See, e.g., FTC v. Feldman, 532 F.2d 1092, 1095 (7th Cir.
1976) (subpoenas must be enforced so agency can determine its own jurisdiction and
possible collateral estoppel); FTC v. Markin, 532 F.2d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 1976) (question
of collateral estoppel is for agency to evaluate after subpoenas are enforced).
48. See FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 880-81 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 974 (1977) (approving Seventh Circuit's use of jurisdictional facts concept in
FTC v. Feldman, 532 F.2d 1092, 1095 (7th Cir. 1976), see note 47 supra, to evaluate col-
lateral estoppel defense); Reply Brief for Appellant at 13-14, FTC v. Texaco, Inc., id. (in
response to defendants' collateral estoppel defense, FTC argued that restriction of access
to jurisdictional facts amounted to imposition of "unlawful prior restraint").
49. Exhaustion of remedies requires that claims within the jurisdiction of an agency
be raised with the agency before a litigant has access to the courts. It allows the spe-
cialized agency the first opportunity to pass on administrative questions and to achieve
uniformity and consistency. E.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S.
426, 441-43 (1903). See Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952)
(exhaustion of remedies principle guarantees that private party can not pass over
agency that has jurisdiction over claim in question). See generally 3 K. Dkvis, supra note
44, at §§ 20.00-.10. The jurisdictional facts doctrine (the protection of agency sub-
poenas from jurisdictional attacks, see notes 47-48 supra) furthers the principle of ex-
haustion of remedies.
50. The primary jurisdiction principle requires that issues within the jurisdiction
of an agency be referred to that agency by the court, even if the litigant's claim as a
whole is cognizable by the court. See United States v. Western Pac. Ry., 352 U.S. 59, 63
(1956); 3 K. DAvis, supra note 44, at § 19.01. Like the exhaustion of remedies principle,
see note 49 supra, primary jurisdiction determines the forum in which a matter will be
litigated first, rather than whether an issue needs to be reopened. See United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353 (1963) (determination that agency has primary
jurisdiction of issue does not mean that court's jurisdiction is ousted, but rather that it
is postponed).
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tween a court and an agency as a trier of fact, and because agencies
are thought to possess expertise in examining facts within their juris-
diction, the agency is considered the appropriate fact-finder.5' Col-
lateral estoppel, however, can be invoked only when an issue has been
decided in a prior proceeding. Thus the question is not which forum
should discover and adjudicate the issue, but whether the issue should
be reexamined. When a coordinate federal agency has already con-
ducted an investigation and reached a judgment on the contested
issue, the facts underlying that issue have already been determined
by an agency with administrative expertise.52 Judicial deference to
agency expertise thus does not require relitigation or rediscovery of
those facts.
Blanket protection of jurisdictional facts does not serve the goals
of an effective subpoena estoppel policy. Efficient law enforcement
is not encouraged when agencies are permitted to discover the same
factual issue twice. Deference to jurisdictional facts effectively sacri-
fices the private party's interest in finality; the private party should
not be penalized because a previously litigated issue rests on factual
matters that are at the border of a second agency's jurisdiction. Fi-
nally, defining what constitutes a jurisdictional fact has been a no-
toriously intractable enterprise. 53 Since both the Morton Salt standard
and the jurisdictional facts principle were developed primarily in re-
51. In Myers Y. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938), a corporation
sought to enjoin an NLRB proceeding on jurisdictional grounds. The Court made clear
that if the exhaustion of remedies principle were to be viable, jurisdictional challenges
would have to await discovery of jurisdictional facts by the agency. Otherwise, "[we
would] substitute the District Court for the Board as the tribunal to hear and determine
what Congress declared the Board exclusively should hear and determine in the first
instance." Id. at 50. But if the private party objected on estoppel grounds, the court
would not have to usurp the agency's role. The court could instead accept and apply
the judgment of an agency created to discover and adjudicate the issue in question.
52. The second agency will also bring administrative expertise to the proceedings.
But collateral estoppel requires an identity of issues, see pp. 1266-67 & notes 89-92 infra,
and the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S.
394 (1966), that the value of finality is the controlling factor once an agency with ex-
pertise has adjudicated a given issue. Assuming that the identity of issues is present,
Utah Construction's disposition of the balance between enforcement and finality should
also foreclose rediscovery.
53. Because a main goal of estoppel is to limit litigation, reliance on factors likely
to introduce the merits of a dispute is self-defeating. But it is often difficult to separate
determination of jurisdictional facts from the merits of a dispute. For a classic example
of the difficulty of ascertaining jurisdictional facts, see United States v. Ju Toy, 198
U.S. 253 (1905). An individual of Chinese descent left the United States and then sought to
return. The immigration officials barred him at the border and claimed that he was a
foreigner. He sought immunity from the jurisdiction of the immigration officials by
claiming he was a citizen. Thus the jurisdictional facts and the merits of the dispute
became meshed. See generally Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 22-39 (1962) (discussing Ju Toy and other leading jurisdictional facts cases).
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sponse to jurisdictional challenges to agency subpoenas, 54 they are
not responsive to the interests at stake when a private party raises a
collateral estoppel defense to an administrative subpoena.
B. Limits Placed on Collateral Estoppel outside the
Administrative Subpoena Context
A second group of obstacles to an effective subpoena estoppel policy
consists of limits placed on collateral estoppel outside the subpoena
context. In Utah Construction the Supreme Court found collateral
estoppel applicable when administrative agencies act in a judicial
capacity.05 Nonadjudicative proceedings such as ratemaking are not
subject to collateral estoppel. 50
In the Texaco case, the FTC sought to take advantage of this limit
on administrative collateral estoppel. The Commission argued that
because the Federal Trade Commission Act57 encourages the FTC
to make reports to Congress regarding proposed legislation, an FTC
investigative subpoena should not necessarily be treated as part of an
adjudicative proceeding, subject to collateral estoppel. 58 It is true that
a nonadjudicative procedure should not be subject to collateral es-
toppel. Yet some agencies, including the FTC, establish wholly sep-
arate procedures for adjudicative and nonadjudicative proceedings, so
a court can easily identify nonadjudicative subpoenas issued by such
agencies. 9 A court can also demand that documents obtained by non-
adjudicative subpoenas be sequestered from an agency's adjudicative
54. See notes 13 9- 45 supra.
55. See note 27 supra.
56. Another possible implication of the Court's language in Utah Construction is
that a nonadjudicative, quasi-legislative proceeding such as ratemaking would be an in-
appropriate base for a collateral estoppel claim. This was Judge Leventhal's argument
in the concurring opinion of the Texaco case, see note 9 supra. But this limitation is
unnecessary. When an agency acts in a legislative capacity, it should not be bound by any
previous finding of fact or law, whatever its source. But if in the course of a quasi-
legislative proceeding, an agency holds hearings that provide both sides with the same
procedural rights and access to the decisionmaking process provided by formal adjudi-
cation, no purpose is served by requiring the parties to relitigate in subsequent adjudica-
tion the issues concluded.
57. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
58. See Reply Supplemental Brief on Rehearing En Banc for Appellant at 23-24,
FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977);
Brief for Appellant at 33-34, FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 517 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd
en banc, FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977).
59. The FTC has separate rules for adjudicative and nonadjudicative proceedings.
See 16 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1977) (initiation of nonadjudicative investigations); id. § 2.7 (non-
adjudicative subpoenas); id. § 3.11 (initiation of adjudicative proceedings); id. § 3.34
(subpoena power). The FMC also distinguishes between formal adjudicative procedures,
46 C.F.R. §§ 502.61-.170 (1976), and nonadjudicative procedure, id. §§ 502.281-.291,
with parallel subpoena rules. See id. § 502.131 (formal adjudicative subpoena for FMC);
id. § 502.286 (nonadjudicative compulsory process for FMC).
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staff and excluded from adjudicative proceedings. 0 Such an "exclu-
sionary rule" would reduce the agency's incentive to subvert collateral
estoppel by issuing a nonadjudicative subpoena.
Law-tied considerations"' have been urged as barriers to collateral
estoppel in administrative law.62 These considerations are, first, that
estoppel rules may be relaxed when applied to favored agencies whose
work demonstrates special social importance, 3 and, second, that the
language or legislative history of an agency's enabling statute might
protect the agency from estoppel based on another agency's adjudi-
cations. 64
60. In United States v. Litton Indus., Inc., 462 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1972), the court was
faced with simultaneous proceedings brought by the FTC. In one proceeding, the FTC was
engaged in a nonadjudicative investigation into the behavior of conglomerates. In the
other, the FTC was bringing an adjudicative divestiture action against Litton. Litton
objected that the FTC was seeking to obtain information via a "nonadjudicative sub-
poena" to use in the divestiture action. The court held that if the FTC did use the
"investigative documents" against Litton, it would constitute a violation of the de-
fendants' due process rights. The warning notwithstanding, the court then enforced the
subpoenas. 462 F.2d at 17-18.
Confronted with similar circumstances, the District of Columbia Circuit took prophy-
lactic measures to prevent such a transfer in FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 567 F.2d
96 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The FTC was conducting a study of the natural gas industry at
the request of Congress. Atlantic was a party both to the investigative proceeding and
an adjudicative proceeding alleging violations of antitrust laws. The court ordered that
the documents obtained by the investigation should be withheld from the FTC officials
supervising the adjudicative proceeding. 567 F.2d at 107.
61. Procedural rules are law-tied when controlled by substantive law. Law-tied rules
can generate tensions between the policies of the rules themselves and the policies of
the substantive law for which the procedural scheme must adjust. For example, rules
regarding dispute resolution, rights of access to alternative forums, and arbitration could
serve the national labor policy of fostering industrial peace. Predictability for both sides
to collective bargaining agreements is served by committing the union and its members
to arbitration for dispute resolution. But in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974), a plaintiff was granted an additional right of action in federal court for a claim
that had earlier been submitted to arbitration, because the claim alleged racial dis-
crimination. Although this decision served the ends of Title VII, the goals of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act were not served. When the procedural rule scheme adjusts
for differences in substantive claims or laws, the policies underlying the procedural
rule scheme are similarly "adjusted." See also Western Addition Community Organiza-
tion v. NLRB (Emporium Capwell, Inc.), 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S.
50 (1975); NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir.
1973). See generally Meltzer, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination:
The More Remedies, the Better?, 42 U. CHr. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1974) (critical of Gardner-
Denver line of cases as threat to goals of NLRA procedural framework).
62. See Groner & Sternstein, Res Judicata in Federal Administrative Law, 39 IowA L.
REV. 300, 312 (1954) (criticizing United States v. Willard Tablet Co., 141 F.2d 141 (7th
Cir. 1944), for enforcing estoppel against enforcement of Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
of 1938, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1970), which deserves favored treatment); Kleinfeld & Goding,
Res Judicata and Two Coordinate Federal Agencies, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 388, 392 (1947)
(suggesting narrow application of res judicata to Food and Drug Administration and
FTC proceedings because these agencies clearly serve the public welfare).
63. See note 62 supra.
64. See North Carolina v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 537 F.2d 67 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 870 (1976) (prior FTC adjudication not binding in part because successful de-
fense to action brought under § 5, Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1970), was not intended to confer immunity from Sherman Act prosecutions).
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It has been argued that application of collateral estoppel should
depend on "the ultimate policies involved" in a given case. 5 For
example, in order to protect the public interest in healthful food
and drugs, the FDA should not be bound by other agency adjudica-
tions. 6 Such general policy considerations neglect the interests present
in a subpoena estoppel defense. The public's interest in providing
administrative agencies with the means to respond to urgent devel-
opments does not require general consideration of an agency's worthi-
ness.0 7 Moreover, to allow a preferred agency a second opportunity
to discover and litigate an issue that has already been decided in-
vites conflict with the findings of another competent tribunal and
would discourage agency cooperation. Finally, deciding whether an
agency's purpose justifies judicial deference to the agency's subpoenas
could foster a substantial amount of litigation in its own right, thus
defeating a primary goal of collateral estoppel. 68
Alternatively, the second law-tied consideration-a specific congres-
sional directive that addressed the collateral estoppel question for a
particular agency-would not encourage unnecessary litigation. When
Congress bars estoppel of an agency's adjudications on the basis of the
findings of another administrative body, courts must enforce that
agency's subpoenas despite the resulting costs. Yet such provisions are
rare.09
65. See Groner & Sternstein, supra note 62, at 312.
66. Id. An analogous argument is made in Mitchell v. NBC, 553 F.2d 265 (2d Cir.
1977). The plaintiff had unsuccessfully presented a racial discrimination claim before a
state agency, the New York State Commission on Human Rights, and the state appellate
division affirmed the agency ruling. The plaintiff then entered federal court and argued
that her civil rights had been violated and that damages should be awarded pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). The district court held that the state administrative decision
was res judicata. Mitchell v. NBC, 418 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's judgment. 553 F.2d at 265. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36 (1974), discussed at note 61 supra, was distinguished because in that case
the agency judgment was not affirmed by a court before reaching federal court. In his
dissent, Judge Feinberg read Gardner-Denver more broadly and argued that a civil
rights plaintiff was entitled to parallel and overlapping remedies. Judge Feinberg con-
cluded that racial discrimination claims are important enough to warrant duplication.
Id. at 277-80.
67. Collateral estoppel rules would not tie the hands of the agencies in such circum-
stances. A change in material circumstances would defeat the required identity of issues
and unbind the agency from the prior adjudication. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333
U.S. 591, 598-602 (1948); IB MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE f 0.415, 0.448 (2d ed. 1974).
68. This last problem would not even be mitigated by the operation of stare decisis.
The consideration due an agency with a wide jurisdiction would vary with the subject
matter of the subpoena in a given case. Once the question of the character or subject
matter of the investigation is opened, the opportunities for litigation would be unre-
stricted by past cases. The party and agency would argue the merits of the investigation
to decide whether the merits should even be reached.
69. Of the two such provisions that have surfaced in the case law, one works to
weaken collateral estoppel claims, the other acts to strengthen these claims. Both have
been applied where parties sought to bind adversaries in judicial proceedings to previous
1261
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 87: 1247, 1978
Another obstacle to an effective subpoena estoppel policy is raised
by judicial treatment of collateral estoppel on issues of law. Because
law changes, courts have hesitated to enforce collateral estoppel on
issues of law in any context.7 0 To condition the results of one pro-
ceeding on those of another still subject to reversal or reinterpreta-
tion might lead to uneven or unstable judgments. t Accordingly, courts
may refuse to recognize a collateral estoppel defense to a subpoena
investigating a previously decided mixed issue of fact and law.72
Whatever its merits in other contexts, the reluctance to bind parties
to findings of law is not an appropriate policy when a private party
defends against an administrative subpoena.73 Efficient and thorough
agency law enforcement does not require limiting subpoena estoppel
to pure issues of fact. A private party pleading estoppel on the basis
of a previous agency adjudication is seeking to enforce repose, that
is, to avoid a lengthy trial. If the initial administrative adjudication
of the issue of law is later reversed, the subpoena can then be enforced
without waste of administrative resources. Further, agency coopera-
administrative adjudications. See North Carolina v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 537 F.2d 67
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976) (see note 64 supra); Painters Dist. Council
No. 38 v. Edgewood Contracting Co., 416 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1969) (plaintiffs claiming
damages for unfair labor practices in civil suit under NLRA § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970),
can rely on favorable ruling under NLRA § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970)); United Eng'rs &
Constructors, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 363 F. Supp. 845 (D.N.J. 1973)
(same).
70. See United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242 (1924); Shell Oil Co. v. Texas Gas
Transmission Corp., 176 So. 2d 692 (La. Ct. of App. 1965); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD,
supra note 19, at § 11.20; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 70 (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1(b) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977). But see Hadge v. Second Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 409 F.2d 1254 (1st Cir. 1969); Florasynth Laboratories, Inc. v. Goldberg,
191 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1951).
71. Because the decision on appeal would redefine the final judgment, those cases
or proceedings that relied on or were bound by the reversed decision might have to be
reopened or otherwise modified. See lB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcrrICE f 0.416[2] (2d ed.
1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41.3 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
72. The defendants in FTC v. Texaco made a point of characterizing the issues on
which they sought estoppel as issues of fact. Joint Memorandum of Respondents in Op-
position to FTC Petitions for Enforcement at 50, FTC v. Texaco, Inc., No. 1089-73 (D.D.C.,
March 22, 1974), rev'd en bane, 555 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977).
Even this strategy was not without risk, however, because courts have been reluctant to in-
terrupt the administrative process where issues of "fact" are involved. See Borden, Inc. v.
FTC, 495 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1974) (exhaustion of remedies principle demands that agency
be permitted to proceed with development of issues of fact). But exhaustion of remedies,
like the primary jurisdiction principle, should have limited application when the party
seeking to interrupt the administrative process has already submitted to discovery and
adjudication of the same issues by an administrative agency. See pp. 1257-58 & notes
49-52 supra.
73. The law/fact distinction makes more sense when considering "offensive" collateral
estoppel (i.e., when collateral estoppel is used to prove a claim), because in those cases
a finding of law in another forum could serve as the basis for an entire cause of action.




tion is not fostered by allowing agencies to relitigate and rediscover
mixed issues of fact and law, and, inevitably, the task of distinguish-
ing pure issues of fact from mixed issues of fact and law is likely
to generate additional litigation.7 4
III. Toward a Functional Analysis
The collateral estoppel subpoena defense should be responsive to
the goals of finality and thorough agency law enforcement. A private
party should be relieved of the cost of answering a subpoena without
denying an administrative agency its "day in court." Additionally,
estoppel policy for administrative subpoenas should foster agency co-
operation where possible. Because collateral estoppel requires a full
hearing on the issue in question before estoppel is enforced, analysis
of an estoppel defense should focus on the extent of adversariness in
the initial proceeding and on overlap of issues.
A. Adversariness
In Texaco both Judge Leventhal and Judge Wilkey initiated their
analyses of the subpoena estoppel defense by considering the adequacy
of the prior proceeding.7 5 Estoppel of an administrative subpoena can-
not be enforced without proof of a prior proceeding that was pro-
cedurally adequate to provide the party being estopped with a full
opportunity to litigate the contested issue. A court thus should first
review the adversariness of the prior proceeding, as did Judge Leven-
thal and Judge Wilkey in Texaco.
The review for adversariness should ensure that the party to be
estopped had adequate access to the earlier factfinding and law-
finding. The Administrative Procedure Act"0 defines formal agency
adjudication in terms of both procedural guarantees 77 and specific
74. The categories tend to merge. See FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co.,
344 U.S. 392 (1953) (majority found defendant's acts were unfair method of compe-
tition (matter of fact) but dissent characterized issue as scope of prohibition of unfair
methods of competition (matter of law)); Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive Federal Jurisdic-
tion and The Effect of Prior State-Court Determinations, 53 VA. L. REV. 1360, 1368-69
(1967) (enumerating practical difficulties of distinguishing between findings of fact and
findings of law).
75. See notes 11 & 56 supra.
76. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1970).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970). These rights include the right to be accompanied by counsel,
APA § 9, 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1970), to present evidence, APA § 5, 5 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1970),
and to cross-examine witnesses. See generally International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
International Wire, 357 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ohio 1972), afj'd, 475 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973).
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characteristics of the decisionmaking process78 that offer the parties
the same access to the decisionmaking process as they receive in a
court. An agency proceeding consistent with the APA's model of formal
adjudication would satisfy the requirement of adversariness for a suc-
cessful estoppel defense.
Administrative agencies employ many procedures, however, not all
of which contain the full panoply of procedural guarantees.79 This
need not in itself impede judicial application of collateral estoppel.
Even if the first proceeding did not meet APA standards for formal
adjudication, the second investigating agency should be bound by the
earlier determination unless the second agency grants the party sig-
nificantly greater procedural rights than the party enjoyed in the
first proceeding.80 The agency seeking to avoid estoppel should not
be able to disown the first agency's judgment unless the second
agency's proceedings offer the private party a greater opportunity
to litigate his claim.8'
Attention to adversariness would assure consistent results only when
consistency is desirable-after a hearing that was at least as adequate
as that which would follow. The value of finality for the private party
-avoiding costly discovery-would be served, but not at the expense
of enforcement of the law; if the second proceeding afforded sub-
stantially greater opportunities to develop an issue, collateral estoppel
would not interfere.
If the question of adversariness is unclear and the court is not con-
vinced that the adversariness requirement has been satisfied, the court
should examine the circumstances surrounding the parties' actions in
78. Compare APA § 5, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970) (adjudication) with APA § 4, 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 (1970) (rulemaking). The adjudicative decision is characterized by a judgment on
the merits, on the record, without consultation with authorities not subject to cross-
examination.
79. See Schopflocher, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Administrative Law, 1942
Wis. L. REv. 5, 37-41 (argues against categorical labeling of adjudicative versus nonad-
judicative procedure).
80. If the first proceeding had all of the elements of adversariness outlined by the
APA, there could be no basis for a second proceeding, so long as the overlap-of-issues
requirement was satisfied.
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1(c) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) ("A new
determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness
of the procedures followed in the two courts . . .. "); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
mENTS § 88.2 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975) (gives consideration to whether party against
whom preclusion is asserted has procedural opportunities unavailable in first proceed-
ing). Since we rely on certain dispute-resolution procedures to discover a just result, the
interest in finality should prevail over the prospect of a second proceeding that offers
no additional procedural guarantees. See generally Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power
and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87 YALE L.J. 164, 184-88 (1977).
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the first proceeding, 82 such as the parties' incentive to litigate and
the agency's opportunity to intervene. 83 A court also could examine
how fully a particular issue was litigated to inform its judgment of
the adequacy of the first proceeding.84 In a given action, either the
agency or the private party litigant might lack incentives to contest
vigorously an issue formally raised in the proceedings and concluded
in the judgment. In related contexts, courts have been reluctant to
enforce estoppel when a particular issue was not carefully considered
in the first proceeding because one or both of the parties lacked the
incentive to litigate.85
Similarly, a court could inquire whether the agency against which
estoppel is asserted had the opportunity to protect its interests in the
first proceeding.8 Although intervention in the first proceeding by
that agency is not always necessary. for granting estoppel, 87 encouraging
such agency cooperation by penalizing nonintervention would help
ensure that the issues will be fully litigated in future proceedings.
Thus, a court entertaining an estoppel defense to a subpoena might
consider whether the second agency had reason to know that its in-
terests were at stake in the first proceeding and had the opportunity
to intervene in the proceeding."
82. The court should first use the APA criteria of adversariness as a guide to measure
whether the second proceeding will offer the party pleading estoppel a significantly
greater opportunity to develop his defense. See note 77 supra.
83. These criteria are subsidiary because although they serve the goals of estoppel
policy, they turn on relatively complex issues of fact and so would generate litigation. As
such, they do not contribute to all of estoppel policy's goals.
84. Just as a court in a negligence action would hesitate to give estoppel effect to
a previous conviction for a traffic violation, a court entertaining an estoppel claim must
consider the incentives on both sides to litigate in the first proceeding. See Thornburg
v. Perleberg, 158 N.W.2d 188 (N.D. 1968) (error even to admit evidence of traffic con-
viction); Haynes v. Rollins, 434 P.2d 234 (Okla. 1967) (same); Loughner v. Schmelzer,
412 Pa. 283, 218 A.2d 768 (1966) (same).
85. See A. Duda & Sons Coop. Ass'n v. United States, 495 F.2d 193, 197-98 (5th Cir. 1974)
(considering claim that prior judgment should not have binding effect since it might
have been conceded by one party for tactical purposes); Safir v. Gibson, 432 F.2d 137,
145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970) (reviewing whether private party had
sufficient incentive to defend issue in prior proceeding that did not involve possible
financial liability).
86. For example, in the Texaco case the FTC investigation began before the FPC
hearings on the reserve estimates issue were concluded. See note 11 supra.
87. Because one agency is bound to the adjudications of another by the privity doc-
trine, intervention is not necessary. See pp. 1251-52 & notes 26-29 supra.
88. See Aerojet Gen. Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
908 (1975) (since state neglected chance to join agency proceeding, judgment adverse to
agency was binding in subsequent suit); Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines,
396 F. Supp. 678, 684 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (defendants forbidden to relitigate claim in
state court, although not parties to first judgment, because they were aware that their
interests iwere included in first proceeding). See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra
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B. Overlap of Issues
To serve the goals of subpoena policy, analysis of the adversariness
of the first proceeding must be combined with analysis of the issues
decided. Collateral estoppel traditionally requires an identity of issues
between the subject of the first judgment and the focus of estoppel
in the second proceeding.8 9 Although this element ensures that parties
are estopped only on issues determined in previous proceedings, the
standard of literal identity obstructs effective collateral estoppel
policy.90
Rather than require a literal identity of issues, courts should look
for a functional overlap between issues litigated and issues investi-
gated in the subpoena in question. Even though the prior judgment
or finding applied a legal standard or rule different from that in-
volved in the second investigation, 91 a court should ask whether the
note 19, at § 11.31; RESTATEMfENT (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 111.2 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1977); R ESTATEIENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88.3 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975); Note, The
Expanding Scope of the Res Judicata Bar, 54 TEx. L. REv. 527 (1976) (critical of Aerojet).
89. See 1B MooRE'S FEDERAL PRAcricE f 0.443[1] (2d ed. 1974).
90. The requirement of identity of issues can be taken quite literally. Courts have
rejected a finding of identity of issues simply because different statutes were involved
in the second proceeding, without further analysis of the possibility that common factual
issues (or mixed issues of fact and law, see note 72 supra) were in fact involved in the
proceedings. If issues are identical, a different underlying purpose for the second agency's
existence does not require relitigation. See note 52 supra. Nevertheless, the identity of
issues requirement has been treated as requiring an identity of underlying legislative
purpose. See Brandenfels v. Day, 316 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (court refused to bind
FTC to Post Office adjudication, because agencies act under different statutes, though
court did not consider whether Post Office proceedings had reached issues FTC would
pursue); Brief for Appellant at 30, FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 517 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
rev'd en banc, 555 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977) ("The Federal
Trade Commission's law-enforcement responsibilities are plainly different from that of
the Federal Power Commission. . . . The presence of different statutes mean[s] . . a
different legislative purpose and results in the absence of an identity of issues which
is required for res judicata or collateral estoppel.")
Although not an administrative proceeding, Brubaker v. King, 505 F.2d 534 (7th Cir.
1974), suggests the lengths to which courts will pursue a literal identity of issues. The
plaintiff sought to bring a damage action for wrongful arrest pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970). The state court in the previous criminal proceeding determined that the arresting
officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant. In the civil suit in federal court, the
defendant officer sought to apply the state court finding collaterally to estop the plain-
tiff's claim. The Seventh Circuit held that because the probable cause test is different
for civil damage actions than for criminal proceedings, estoppel was inappropriate. This
ruling seems counter-intuitive, however, because the requirement for probable cause is
far easier for the civil defendant to meet than for the state in a criminal prosecution.
See Brubaker v. King, 505 F.2d at 537 (in tort action against government agent, de-
fendant need show only reasonable good faith belief of probable cause).
91. Courts have enforced estoppel on the basis of a judgment tied to a statute
different from the one that underlay the second proceeding. Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act makes illegal "unfair or deceptive acts or practices," 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1970). The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) prohibits labeling that is "false
and misleading in any particular." FDCA § 502, 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1970). In United States
v. Willard Tablet Co., 141 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1944), a prosecution under the FDCA was
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subject of the present inquiry was necessarily decided in the former
judgment. -2
In Safir v. Gibson93 the court looked beyond the holding of the
first proceeding to find a functional overlap between the issues con-
cluded in the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) proceeding and
the issues presented in the Federal Maritime Association (FMA)
proceedings that were to follow.94 In the initial proceeding, certain
defendants were found in violation of a statute prohibiting unrea-
sonably low rates. Based on this finding, a plaintiff later sued those
defendants and claimed to be an object of unjust discrimination pro-
hibited by another statute.95 Since this plaintiff was the injured per-
son who had participated in the initial proceeding, the court found
that the issue in question in the second proceeding had been decided
in the first notwithstanding the different statutes involved.
The functional overlap requirement serves the goals of an effective
subpoena estoppel policy. The interest in finality requires that pri-
vate parties be forced to endure costly investigations of the same
issue only once, regardless of the statute underlying the investigation.
Moreover, since the different administrative agencies enforce many
different laws, the goal of encouraging inter-agency cooperation re-
quires a flexible overlap-of-issues standard that looks beyond the
names of the statutes to the issues involved in the proceedings.
estopped by a previous FTC adjudication. In George H. Lee v. FTC, 113 F.2d 583 (8th
Cir. 1940), the FTC was deemed to be bound by a previous adjudication under the
Foods and Drugs Act, a predecessor of the FDCA. See also Safir v. Gibson, 432 F.2d 137
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
92. Judicial collateral estoppel has already developed along the recommended lines
when applying criminal convictions to civil proceedings. Most courts no longer require
a literal identity of issues, and instead accept a functional overlap between the issues
concluded in the criminal judgment and those contested in the second action. In
Travelers Indem. Ins. Co. v. Walburn, 378 F. Supp. 860 (D.D.C. 1974), a criminal con-
viction for second degree murder, which required a finding of malice, estopped the
civil defendant from denying that he acted with knowledge that he would cause harm.
In the civil action, this finding acted to suspend the defendant's insurance coverage.
In Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 375 P.2d 439, 25 Cal. Rptr.
559 (1962) (en banc) a plaintiff in a civil action was estopped from denying that the alleged
theft for which he sought recovery was a fraudulent claim. The plaintiff was in privity
with the company president who had been convicted for conspiracy to commit grand theft.
Although in each case the previous criminal conviction overcame a different burden of
proof, the court in each recognized that in fact the standard was more favorable to
the defendant in the criminal case, and estoppel in the civil case was appropriate. But see
Brubaker v. King, 505 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1974), discussed at note 90 supra.
93. 432 F.2d 137 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
94. See note 17 supra.
95. Although the FMC did not make a specific finding on the unjust discrimination
issue, the court examined the Commission's docket, as well as the judgment. The court
held that the FMC found the rates to be unreasonably low because they were "admit-
tedly unreasonable and noncompensatory and were justified only in furtherance of the
unfair attempt to drive . . . [the plaintiffs] from the trade." 432 F.2d at 141.
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The goal of thorough agency law enforcement also requires con-
sideration of the role of a given subpoena in an investigation. Sub-
poena estoppel should not deny the administrative agency the chance
to frame issues for further inquiry outside the scope of the original
adjudication." 6 Thus the court should consider the agency's ability
to frame alternative issues without access to the subpoenaed materials.
A court could expect an agency with access either to private docu-
ments through earlier rounds of discovery97 or to other available
sources of information9" to avoid subjects of previous adjudications
more easily than if the agency were just beginning an investigation. 0
If an agency has access to such documents or information, the court
should be less ready to provide the agency with documents relevant
only to an issue already adjudicated. But if an agency is beginning
an investigation without access to most relevant material, the court
should be more tolerant of overlap.
A consideration of the agency's alternative avenues of inquiry would
further the goals of estoppel by encouraging agencies to use available
documents efficiently. Furthermore, consideration of the particular
investigation's history would recognize the burdens imposed by nu-
merous or broad subpoenas but would allow agencies with no prior
access to any documents to tread closer to previously concluded issues.
IV. A Rule for Applying Collateral Estoppel
to Administrative Subpoenas
The considerations of adversariness and overlap of issues suggested
above for analyzing a collateral estoppel defense to an administrative
subpoena can be formulated as a practical rule:
An administrative subpoena that requests documents or other
materials relevant only to an issue concluded in a prior adminis-
trative proceeding shall not be enforced by a federal court.100
96. See p. 1254 & note 37 supra.
97. For example, in the Texaco case, the American Gas Association, a trade association
composed of natural gas producers and distributors, complied voluntarily with the FTC
inquiry into gas reserve estimates.
98. Data might be available to the agency in the public record.
99. A strong prejudice exists in the case law against considering private party costs,
because courts are reluctant to allow financial considerations to dilute the principle of
agency expertise. See Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 495 F.2d 785, 789 (7th Cir. 1974).
100. The test for collateral estoppel could also be applied by the agency itself. Fol-
lowing an objection to a subpoena by a private party, the agency or Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) would be in a position to apply the suggested analysis. Cf. In re Exxon
Corp., 86 F.T.C. 585, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) f 20,990 (1975)
(see note 32 supra) (FTC affirms ALJ decision refusing to give collateral estoppel or res
judicata effect to previous Justice Department antitrust suits against oil companies de-
fending in present FTC adjudication). But the final responsibility for enforcement in the
event of noncompliance would involve a federal court.
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A. For the purposes of this rule, a prior administrative proceeding
that concludes an issue is defined as a proceeding in which:
(1) both the administrative agency and the private party were
given a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and
(2) there was a judgment on the merits of the issue(s) that over-
laps with the issue(s) currently under investigation.
B. The court may consider the following factors in deciding whether
the adversariness requirement contained in A(l) is satisfied:
(1) the parties' incentive to litigate the issue in question in the
first proceeding, and
(2) the investigating agency's opportunity to intervene in the first
proceeding.
C. The court shall consider the following factors when the overlap
requirement contained in A(2) is satisfied:
(1) whether the number and scope of the subpoenas that the pri-
vate party has answered in the course of the instant investigation
provided the agency with the means to frame alternative issues for
inquiry, and
(2) whether other sources of information are available to the agency
for the purpose of framing alternative issues.
V. Two Hypothetical Cases
The proposed rule will be applied to two hypothetical cases, which
present different permutations of the Texaco fact pattern.
1. Suppose that the Federal Power Commission (FPC) initiated an
investigation into the gas reserve estimates of the natural gas producers
in the course of a ratemaking proceeding. The ratemaking proceeding
began in 1965, the reserve estimates hearings began in 1968, and the
Administrative Law Judge's decision on the reserve estimates was is-
sued in 1972. The Administrative Law Judge decided that the reserve
estimates were "accurate for the purposes of ratemaking."
In 1970 the Federal Trade Commission began an investigation into
the accuracy of the gas reserve estimates, pursuant to the FTC's re-
sponsibility to discover and prevent fraudulent business practices. The
FTC issued subpoenas to the gas producers; one round of discovery
ended in 1970, the second began in 1972. Although the gas producers
complied with the first set of subpoenas, they refused to comply with
the second set and asserted that the 1972 FPC judgment collaterally
estopped the 1972 FTC subpoena. The FTC answered that the FPC
decision could not serve as an appropriate base for an estoppel de-
fense because the FPC was engaged in a ratemaking proceeding, and
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since ratemaking is a quasi-legislative function, findings in a rate-
making proceeding cannot be res judicata.' 01
Analysis can begin with the overlap-of-issues requirement. If the
reserve estimates are accurate, they cannot be fraudulent. The ques-
tion is whether "accuracy for ratemaking purposes" meets the standard
of accuracy required to defend against a fraudulent business practice
claim. To the extent that this is the case, the required overlap (but
not identity) of issues is present.10 2
The second requirement for estoppel focuses on the nature of the
first proceeding. Although that proceeding was nominally a ratemak-
ing proceeding, the proposed rule requires an evaluation of the pro-
cedures employed to determine the issue in question. The hearings
before the ALJ were specifically addressed to the reserve estimates
question. Although the issue was decided pursuant to a ratemaking
proceeding, the tests for adversariness would be met if the hearing
before the ALJ provided both sides with at least as many procedural
rights as the proceeding that would follow the 1972 FTC subpoenas.
Assuming that this is the case, the FPC judgment is an appropriate
base for estoppel.
Any doubts on the adversariness question can be resolved by re-
ferring to the incentives to litigate and the FTC's opportunity to
intervene in the earlier proceeding. The ratemaking proceeding cen-
tered on the reserve estimates hearings; the FPC's attempt to pro-
cure a basis for lower rates for natural gas focused on the theory of
underreporting of reserves. The unsuccessful party (FPC) had every
incentive to litigate the issue. Further, the FTC had ample opportunity
to intervene, since the two investigations took place concurrently. 0 3
Because adversariness and overlap of issues are satisfied, collateral es-
toppel should be enforced against the FTC.
2. Suppose instead that the FTC initiated an investigation in 1970
into the accuracy of the gas reserve estimates. The FTC investigation
was avowedly adjudicative, 04 and the FTC hearings followed the APA
model of formal adjudication. In deciding that the gas producers had
not violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,105 the
FTC found the yearly reserve estimates for 1970-1975 to be accurate.
101. See note 9 supra.
102. In his Texaco dissent, Judge Wilkey argued that these standards were equivalent.
FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 932-33 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
974 (1977) (dissenting opinion).
103. For FPC rules on intervention, see note 39 supra.
104. The FTC has different rules for adjudicative investigations. See note 59 supra.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
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In 1976 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an
investigation of officers and directors of the gas producers. The SEC
alleged that these insiders had failed to disclose pertinent information
in their possession when they purchased company stock in 1973, in
violation of SEC Rule lOb-5.1OO The SEC suspected that the gas pro-
ducers had misled investors by delaying public disclosure of discovered
gas reserves. 10 7 When the SEC issued subpoenas to the gas producers
for their reserve estimates, the gas producers defended on grounds of
collateral estoppel. The producers argued that the issue of the ac-
curacy of the reserve estimates was closed by the FTC adjudication.
The defendants further argued that since the reported reserves were
accurate, the public could not have been misled, and the purchases
by insiders did not violate Rule lOb-5.
The requirement of adversariness is clearly satisfied since the FTC
proceedings meet the APA standards for formal adjudication. Even
though the SEC could not intervene in the FTC proceedings because
of the timing of the investigations, the criterion of adversariness is
satisfied by the procedural guarantees of the first proceeding.
The overlap-of-issues requirement, however, is not satisfied. Al-
though the FTC did address reserve estimates, the SEC's theory of a
Rule lOb-5 violation acknowledges the possibility that year-end re-
serves in 1973 were accurate. Conceivably, the gas producers could
have misled investors by delaying the disclosure of new gas discoveries
without rendering inaccurate the year-end reported reserve estimates.
Although the FTC addressed the question of intra-year reporting
techniques, the focus of the investigation was on year-end estimates.
An alternative formulation of this problem is that the FTC did not
actively litigate the issue of intra-year reserve estimates, but instead
concentrated on year-end reserves. Any doubt on the question of over-
lap of issues is dispelled because this is the SEC's first subpoena in
the investigation, and the SEC simply does not have other means for
pursuing the case. If the SEC had access to documents relevant to
intra-year reporting techniques, the FTC judgment could be a ground
for estoppel of the SEC subpoenas. But given the SEC's position, the
subpoenas should be enforced.
106. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
107. A somewhat similar set of facts is found in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
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